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Counterfactual theories of causation of the sort presented in Mackie, 1974, and Lewis, 1973 are a familiar part of the philosophical landscape. Such theories are typically advanced primarily as accounts of the metaphysics of causation. But they also raise issues that are directly relevant to empirical psychology. Most obviously, advocates of counterfactual theories usually claim their theories capture features of ordinary practices of causal reasoning and judgment. For example, it is important to Lewis that his theory reproduce the causal judgments of subjects (or perhaps informed and sophisticated subjects) in cases involving pre-emption, over-determination, and causation by absence. Such claims raise empirical issues about what those judgments are and how they are best explained. 
A second, not unrelated issue has to do with what counterfactual accounts should be taken to imply about the psychological processes and representations that underlie human causal reasoning. For example, should we think of such accounts as implying that human subjects internally represent causal claims in terms of counterfactual judgments and that when they engage in causal reasoning, this involves reasoning about counterfactual claims? How plausible is this as a matter of empirical psychology? Alternatively, should we instead think of such accounts (to the extent they are plausible at all) as merely ‘as if’ accounts, that may successfully describe aspects of human causal judgment, but carry no commitments about underlying psychological processing in terms of counterfactuals? 
 A third issue is that human beings seem fairly successful at learning about causal relationships – such success is manifested in, for example, their acquisition of causal information enabling manipulation and control, as exhibited in non-verbal as well as verbal behavior. Psychological theory should explain how such learning occurs (the evidence from which people learn, the learning procedures they employ, the content of what is learned.) This involves more than merely describing the causal judgments that people make and the factors influencing these. Consider the visual system. It does not just produce ‘visual judgments’; it is also important and in need of explanation that those judgments are often veridical. Similarly for causal judgment. 
	In what follows, I explore some of these issues within the framework of the interventionist approach to causation I have defended elsewhere (Woodward, 2003; hereafter MTH). Interventionism was originally intended (at least by me) as a normative account of causal judgment and reasoning—the idea was that one could clarify what causal claims commit us to, the evidence required to support them, and so on by construing such claims as claims about what would happen under possible interventions. However, one can also ask how well this normative account fares as a psychological theory of human causal judgment. I have begun to explore this elsewhere (Woodward, 2007) and here I continue this project, with special focus on the relationship between causal claims and counterfactuals. 
2. Background 

2.1 Causes and Conditions
I begin with some stage-setting. When we ask whether a relationship is ‘causal’, it is important to consider what the quoted word is intended to contrast with— what other kind of relation are we trying to distinguish from those that are causal? One important contrast is with relationships that are merely ‘correlational’. The relationship between barometer readings B and occurrence/non-occurrence S of storms is merely correlational rather than casual; neither B nor S causes the other; instead both are effects of a common cause (atmospheric pressure). Call a notion of cause which contrasts in this way with ‘correlation’ a broad notion; broad in the sense that it includes relationships involving factors we also readily describe not as causes but as ‘conditions’, or as ‘background’ or ‘enabling’ factors for an effect. The relationship between the presence of oxygen and the outbreak of fires is ‘causal’ according to this broad notion, even though we also describe oxygen as a condition rather than a cause of the fire. To mark this difference, let us call a notion of cause that contrasts with conditions, enabling factors etc., a narrow conception of ‘cause’. 
We may distinguish two extreme positions regarding the narrow cause/condition contrast. One possibility is that this contrast is entirely ‘objective’, depending just on features ‘out there’ in the world, rather than on ‘subjective’ considerations such as the inquirer’s attitudes or interests. A simple example of an objectivist view is the claim that conditions are causes in the broad sense that (in addition) are nearly always present (in the contexts of interest), such as the presence of oxygen in the case of fires. By contrast, causes in the narrow sense are factors that are causes in the broad sense that are sometimes present and sometimes not, such as strikings of matches. This is not a very adequate account of the cause/condition contrast but it does ground the contrast in features in the world​[1]​. 
An alternative possibility is that the narrow cause/condition contrast has to do entirely with features of the mental states of inquirers—e.g., with what they find interesting or salient: the policeman regards the drunkenness of the driver as a cause of the accident and the inadequately banked curve as a condition because of his professional role/interests while the highway engineer regards the inadequately banked curve as among the causes because of his interests, but there are no features of the world that ground these differences in judgment. Of course another possibility is that some mixture of these extreme positions is correct
What would follow for the empirical psychology of causal cognition if the cause/condition contrast turned out to have little or no ‘objective’ basis? This depends on what we are interested in explaining. Presumably, it would still be of psychological interest to ask about the subjective factors that influence how the cause/condition distinction is drawn and how this distinction influences other aspects of cognition, such as moral judgment. On the other hand, if the distinction is entirely ‘subjective’, focusing on it may tell us little about how we are able to successfully learn about relationships that are useful for purposes of prediction and control, (assuming, as seems plausible, that such relationships have to do, at least in part, with features of the world that hold independently of people’s interests). Thus for the purposes of understanding learning, there may be much to be said for focusing on a broad notion of cause, since the cause/correlation distinction is arguably both ‘objective’ and central to our interest in manipulation and control.
The process of distinguishing, among those factors which are broad causes, those that we regard as causes in the narrow sense and those that are mere conditions is often described as causal selection and is the focus of a great deal of research, particularly in social psychology. I do not dispute that this is a worthy project for psychological inquiry, but I do claim it is different from elucidating the broad cause/correlation contrast, and that an account of causation may be illuminating in connection with one of these projects and not the other. For example, a proposed connection between causation and counterfactuals may be helpful in distinguishing between broad causal relationships and correlations, but not in understanding causal selection. (I think this is true of the account presented in MTH). 

2.2 Actual Cause Judgments
A second useful distinction has to do with what is commonly described in the philosophical literature in terms of a contrast between type causation (or type causal claims) and token causation (or token or singular causal claims). Type causal claims are often thought of as general causal claims making no explicit reference to any particular instantiation of the cause and effect, as when one says that short circuits cause fires, without referring to any particular short circuit or fire. Token causal claims, by contrast, explicitly claim that some particular event was causally responsible for another, as when one says that the short circuit occurring in Jones’ attic at time t caused the fire that destroyed the attic at t. The type/token terminology is deeply entrenched in philosophical usage. Nonetheless, as ordinarily understood, it is misleading (cf., Hitchcock, 2007). First, contrary to what the type/token terminology suggests, type causal claims should not be understood as claims about the existence of causal relationships between abstract types or properties, which are not realized in particular occurrences. When short circuits cause fires, this always involves particular individual short circuits (tokens) causing particular individual fires (also tokens). 
A deeper point concerns the relationship between type causal claims and our practices of ascribing responsibility to particular events in causing others, which in order to avoid some of the unclarities of type/token distinction, I will call actual cause judgments. As many examples in the literature show, one may have complete knowledge of the type causal relationships obtaining in a given situation (telling us how token realizations of those types are causally related in the situation) and yet this information does not seem to fully constrain the actual cause judgments we make. 
 Although I lack the space for detailed discussion, I take these considerations to suggest that type cause and actual cause judgments play different roles in our thinking and often are guided by different sorts of considerations. With type causal judgments our concern is often forward – looking: it involves reasoning from a cause or potential cause to its effects. Often this involves a concern with prediction or manipulation or with explaining repeatable events. For example, we may use type causal information to predict what will happen if a certain kind of cause occurs or to tell us which means to introduce in order to bring about some desired outcome, as when we reason that application of fertilizer will cause crops to grow. 
By contrast, actual cause judgments are often made in cases in which a particular outcome occurs (often but not always, something bad). Our concern is then to reason ‘back’ from this outcome to another occurrence which can be regarded (either literally or figuratively) as ‘responsible for’ or ‘to blame’ for it. For example, we see a stunted plant and ask what is responsible for its deficient growth (as opposed to asking whether application of fertilizer will in general stimulate plant growth). In some cases, the responsibility in question is moral or legal; in other cases, responsibility may be assigned on the basis of expectations about normal biological functioning or on the basis of some engineering or design norm, as when why we single out the behavior of the O-rings as the cause of the Challenger disaster. 
I don’t claim that this conceptualization in terms of responsibility captures everything that underlies our practices of actual cause judgment, but merely that this is one factor that seems to shape these judgments. However, if this is correct, it suggests it may be a mistake to suppose that getting clearer about our practices of actual cause judgment will automatically illuminate our practices involving type cause judgment. In particular, it may be a mistake to suppose that type causal judgments are merely generalizations to types of actual cause judgments; instead the two kinds of judgment may be guided by considerations that are at least somewhat distinct.
Why does this matter? If one looks at the psychological literature on causal cognition, one sees what looks like two rather different research paradigms or projects, paralleling the distinctions drawn above. In one, typified by the research reported in Gopnik and Schulz (2007), the focus is mainly on learning and reasoning about type causal relations. Normative theories of causal learning and reasoning are relevant in this paradigm because successful performance is part of what researchers want to understand. In a typical experiment, subjects are put in environment in which there are unknown causal relationships and where there is a well-defined notion of making a mistake about these—e.g., concluding something makes a blicket machine go when it doesn’t. Successful acquisition of causal information may be shown by non – verbal behavior (picking out an object as a blicket) as well by correct use of words like ‘cause’. Because of this, the experimental paradigms allow for the possibility (at least in principle) that subjects may have causal representations (and may support these with processing of counterfactuals, probabilities etc.) even if they are non-verbal.
In another, contrasting paradigm (common in social psychology), experiment and theory focus largely on understanding the criteria governing actual cause judgments (and in particular understanding causal selection in connection with such judgments). In a typical experiment (see, e.g., the example from Mandel below) subjects are presented with verbal scenarios involving a particular outcome in which all the broad causal relationships (involving many different factors) are either stipulated (or in some cases left unspecified). The researcher’s interest is which of these factors subjects will pick out as ‘the cause’ or will rate as most strongly causal and what factors affect such judgments. There is no other basis for identifying subject’s actual cause judgments besides their verbal responses to questions. Subjects do not face a learning problem in the way that subjects in the first paradigm do, and there is no obvious standard for whether the subjects’ judgments are correct other than whether they conform to the most common patterns of attribution. 
 I repeat that in my view both projects are interesting and worthwhile. However, I also want to stress that that the understanding of actual cause judgment (including how these are connected to counterfactuals) that the second paradigm yields may tell us less than we would like to know about the project of understanding how humans acquire and use type level causal knowledge for manipulation, control, and explanation, and how type causal judgments are connected to counterfactuals. 
As an illustration, consider an interesting paper by Mandel (2003). Mandel is interested in the role that ‘counterfactual thinking’ plays in causal selection, particularly as expressed in actual cause judgments. He considers the suggestion that those factors most readily picked out as the (or a) cause of some outcome are just those factors that figure in the antecedents of those counterfactuals that most readily come to mind when subjects are asked to consider counterfactuals about which factors might be changed or mutated to prevent or undo the outcome. 
Mandel has little difficulty in showing that (at least when taken in an unqualified way) this suggestion is mistaken. In one experiment, subjects are given a scenario in which Jones decides to drive home via a new route and is injured in a collision with a drunk driver. When subjects are prompted to consider counterfactuals leading to the undoing of the accident, they focus most readily on counterfactuals in which Jones does not choose the new route, but when asked for the cause of Jones’ injuries, they select the collision. This suggests that people’s causal selections are not guided (or are not guided only) by a particular kind of ‘but for’ counterfactual, one that involves undoing the effect. In this sense, there is, as Mandel puts it, a ‘dissociation’ between causal and counterfactual judgments. 
Does it follow that counterfactual theories of causation are mistaken in general when taken as psychological theories? This conclusion seems premature. First, Mandel’s results have to do with one particular aspect of causal cognition: causal selection in connection with actual cause judgments; they simply don’t address the possible role of counterfactuals in discriminating between broad causes and correlations in type cause judgments. Moreover, in the latter connection, what matters, according to most counterfactual theories of causation, is which counterfactuals are true (or are regarded by subjects as true) not which counterfactuals come most readily to mind. It would be very surprising if Mandel’s subjects were to deny the counterfactual claim that if the collision with the drunk driver had not occurred, Jones would not have been injured. Mandel’s results are thus consistent with the contention that counterfactual thinking figures in the distinction people draw between those factors that are broadly causal (these will include both the collision and the choice of route) and those that are merely correlational. Nor, for reasons already explained, do the results of such experiments tell us much about how we learn (or reason) about type causal relationships. Subjects are told what all of the relevant broad causal relationships are in the scenario (there is no learning), and it is hard to see in what sense someone who selects Jones’ choice of route as a cause is making a mistake, other than in departing from common usage. 
 A final point concerns what it means to hold a ‘counterfactual’ theory of causation. There is a strong tendency in the psychological literature (illustrated by Mandel’s scenario) to focus on hypotheses about the connection between causal claims and a particular kind of counterfactual: a ‘but for’ or ‘necessary condition’ counterfactual that relates the absence of the cause to the absence of the effect. (This is understandable since in both philosophy and the law counterfactual theories of causation have tended to employ such counterfactuals). It is thus important to realize that there are many other varieties of counterfactuals that may be linked to casual judgment in one way or another. For example, it is certainly possible to use counterfactuals to attempt to capture the idea that causes are sufficient (as opposed to necessary) in the circumstances for their effects:
If C causes E, then if C were absent  from the actual circumstances and then introduced (via an intervention—see below) into those circumstances, E would occur. 




With this as background, let us turn to some issues in the psychology of causal cognition specifically raised by interventionist accounts of causation. Here I will provide only the briefest overview—the reader is referred to Woodward, 2003 for additional discussion. Interventionists think of causal relationships as relationships that are potentially exploitable for purposes of manipulation and control. A simple characterization of what it is for C to be a type cause of E within such a theory runs is: 

(M) If an intervention that changes the value of C were to occur and if under such an intervention (and no others) C and E would be correlated (or equivalently if E would change under this intervention on C), then C causes E. Conversely, if C causes E, then there are possible interventions that change the value of C such that if such interventions (and no other interventions) were to occur, C and E would be correlated (equivalently, E would change under this intervention on C.) 
 
 ‘Intervention’ is a technical notion; it is a generalization of the notion of an ideal experimental manipulation. Manipulations carried out by human beings are among paradigmatic cases of interventions (and such manipulations arguably play an important role in causal learning—see below) but the notion of an intervention itself can be specified without reference to human agency. However, causal notions are required for the specification of an appropriately behaved notion of intervention. Thus while (M) yields a link between casual claims and what happens under interventions, it does not yield a reductive analysis of causation in terms of claims about counterfactuals (or anything else.) To the extent that we are willing to use (M) as a basis for a psychological theory, it should not encourage us to think that it is possible to characterize causal beliefs in terms of a more general category of counterfactual beliefs that are non-causal in character. 
 (M) is specified in terms of a particular kind of counterfactual which I will call an interventionist counterfactual having to do with what would happen to E if (perhaps contrary to actual fact) interventions on C were to occur. The counterfactual formulation seems natural since we do not want to make whether C causes E depend on whether an intervention on C actually occurs, but I will consider below whether it is really required. 
 (M) is intended as a characterization of a broad notion of (type) causation; it plainly fails to capture the narrow cause/ conditions contrast. For reasons explained above, I do not regard this as a fatal deficiency in (M), either when construed as a normative or descriptive psychological theory (M) will be defensible in the latter role, as long as people draw a contrast between causal and correlational relationships and (M) correctly captures this.
 How should interventionist counterfactuals be understood and what, so to speak, is their psychological significance? As explained above, in normative versions of the theory, the notion of an intervention is not linked essentially to human action. Nonetheless, in developing the approach into a psychological theory, it is very natural to assign special significance to those interventionist counterfactuals that are connected to action (and to planning and means/ends reasoning) directed at changing or transforming the world in order to achieve some goal. If interventionism is on the right track, grasp of such conditionals will be central to at least some aspects of causal cognition. 
 In pursuing this idea, two crucial questions are (i) whether it is possible to be ‘implicitly’ guided by or sensitive to such action-oriented counterfactuals even if one is not able to provide correct verbal answers to explicit questions about them (ii) and, supposing that this is possible, what would constitute evidence for such guidance. The motivation underlying these questions is that, on the one hand, explicit verbal reasoning about counterfactuals seems to require considerable cognitive and linguistic sophistication (arguably not present in, e.g., small children), and yet, on the other hand, it seems natural to understand a great deal of planning and goal-directed action (including that exhibited by small children) as involving a (perhaps tacit) appreciation of conditional relationships. 
 Consider an agent A who recognizes that the present state of the world is X and who wishes to achieve some goal which involves the world being in state X’ X. Suppose also A recognizes that by doing Y, she can change the state of the world to X’. Here we have a simple, action directed counterfactual (or at least a conditional of some kind—see below): if A were to do Y, then X would be the case. Although this assumption may prove, on further analysis, to be a mistake, it seems very natural to suppose that in some circumstances A’s non –verbal behavior can provide evidence that she is guided by or sensitive to such conditionals/ counterfactuals. 
 An illustration is provided by Perner et al. (2004): 
When observing an adult model trigger the blinking of a box by touching the box with her forehead (Meltzoff, 1988) infants will also use their head (and not their hands) for that purpose, but only if the model could have used her hands. Infants do use their hands when the model’s hands were occupied otherwise (for holding a blanket) during the demonstration. Underlying this difference between conditions must be infants’ counterfactual conditional reasoning: ‘if the model had had her hands free …’ (1998-99)
 		Since the infants are preverbal, Perner’s idea must be that the infant’s conditional reasoning is in some sense ‘implicit’ or at least that its ascription does not require that the infant be able to correctly answer questions posed in the form of conditionals (Is it true that if the model could have used her hands, then…?). To anticipate an objection, I agree we should distinguish cases in one is genuinely guided by an implicit grasp of a counterfactual, from cases in which the subject has merely acquired an action—response pattern as a result of instrumental conditioning. But since Perner’s example involves one –shot imitation learning, it does not seem plausible to think of it just as a case of instrumental learning. A number of other phenomena, including backward blocking and learning involving combinations of interventions seem to suggest a similar interpretation in terms of implicit counterfactual processing​[2]​. 
Let us tentatively adopt such an interpretation and see where it leads. First, note that a similar sensitivity to action-counterfactuals must also be present among subjects who are able to parse or minimally understand the actions of others. Such action parsing and means/ends discrimination is known to emerge very early (Meltzoff, 2007) and a natural thought is that it might be part of a scaffolding enabling acquisition of a full-fledged interventionist conception of causation and the understanding of conditional relationships that accompanies this. This idea is explored in more detail in a number of the papers in Gopnik and Schulz, 2007. 
A second set of issues concerns the character of the conditionals that associated with goal directed action. In describing these as ‘counterfactuals’ I followed a very substantial philosophical tradition. Nonetheless, it is a familiar observation that ‘counterfactual’ is (particularly for non-philosophers) a potentially misleading term for these conditionals. To begin with, their truth and even their status as counterfactual, does not require that their antecedents be false. Consider the interventionist conditional 
(3.1) If I were to drop this pencil (as a result of some process that meets the conditions for an intervention), it would fall to the ground 
Suppose I drop the pencil (via some process that meets the conditions for an intervention) and it falls to the ground. I take this to be not just compatible with the truth of (3.1) but good evidence that (3.1) is true. 
	 A more important point is that at least in many cases the conditionals in which we are interested are not sharply distinct from so-called future hypotheticals -- claims about what will happen if some condition is (will be) met in the future. Compare (3.1) with the future hypothetical 
(3.2) If I drop this pencil in the next minute, it will fall to the ground. 
Although some philosophers argue otherwise, in many contexts (3.1) and (3.2) seem very close in meaning and have very nearly the same truth conditions. 
One reason why this matters is that it seems plausible that an account of type causation along the lines of (M) will require only the truth of conditionals interpreted as future hypotheticals—that is, claims about what will happen, under the assumption that certain interventions occur in the future. Thus if beliefs about type causal relationships require or in some way involve a grasp, implicit or otherwise, of conditionals, a grasp of future hypotheticals may be sufficient. 
This is relevant to psychological issues about the relationship between causal beliefs and mastery of various kinds of conditionals. Suppose that, following some psychologists, we restrict the label ‘counterfactual’ to conditionals whose antecedents describe states holding in the present or past that are known (by those evaluating the conditional) to differ from the actual state of the world at that time—that is, conditionals with false antecedents. Call these literal counterfactuals. As an illustration, suppose that I do not drop the pencil at time t and consider:
(3.3) If I had dropped the pencil at time t, it would have fallen to the ground 
Presumably in evaluating (3.3), I need to entertain the supposition described in its antecedent while at the same time retaining my knowledge that this supposition is inconsistent with the actual state of affairs at t. By contrast, in considering (3.2), I don’t need to do this. The antecedent of (3.2) describes a future state that (let us suppose) represents a change from the present state, but in considering (3.2), I don’t need to imagine that this present state was different from what it actually was. 
This is important because, although some of the empirical facts are in dispute, there is some evidence for the following claims: (a) young children (3 years or younger) have difficulty understanding and correctly evaluating literal counterfactuals like (3.3) or at least find these considerably more difficult than the corresponding future hypotheticals, (b) children who have difficulty with such literal counterfactuals, nonetheless exhibit an understanding or a range of causal concepts— as Roessler (forthcoming) observes, they understand concepts like push, pull, etc. and use them to make true causal claims and they correctly solve various other kinds of causal inference problems. It may seem tempting to infer that at least for such children causal beliefs and understanding does not consist in the mastery of ‘counterfactuals’​[3]​. 
The observation that the representation of type causation in terms of conditionals may require only the representation of future hypotheticals may go some way toward reconciling (a) and (b). Interestingly, though, matters may be different with actual cause judgments. Here precisely because such judgments commonly require identifying a cause of an event that has already occurred, to the extent that a conditional account is possible at all, it may require appeal to literal counterfactuals. For example, an account that connects the actual cause judgment that the short circuit caused the fire to some conditional having to do with what would have happened if the fire had not occurred arguably requires a conditional that is understood as a literal counterfactual, rather than a future hypothetical. 
Now, for reasons described above, it isn’t obvious that the correctness of a psychological theory connecting causation and counterfactuals requires that subjects exhibit explicit verbal mastery of counterfactuals. But to the extent that reasoning with literal counterfactuals, whether implicit or explicit, is required for actual cause judgments and to the extent that such reasoning is more difficult for young children than reasoning with future hypotheticals, then it is arguable that we should expect young children to have more difficulty with actual cause judgments than with type cause judgments and to acquire the ability to use the latter appropriately before they acquire the ability to use the former. To the best of my knowledge this issue has not been explored empirically – it would obviously be desirable to do so. Instead, most of the empirical work with which I am familiar on children’s causal learning and seems to involve their mastery of type causal relationships. If my remarks on the differences between actual cause and type causal judgment are on the right track, it seems entirely possible that there may be some developmental dissociation between these two kinds of judgment, with mastery of the latter preceding mastery of the former.

4. Implicit Knowledge of Counterfactuals Again

Putting aside issues about differences in the ways in which type and actual cause judgments may be related to conditionals, let me return to the more general question of how explicit, conscious, and/or tied to verbal performance with counterfactuals a subject’s cognitive processing needs to be to qualify as ‘counterfactual reasoning’. When young children’s fail to give correct answers to questions involving counterfactuals, does this show that they are unable to engage in counterfactual reasoning or that is wrong to think their causal beliefs involve implicit grasp of counterfactuals? Or can counterfactual reasoning/processing be manifested in non- verbal behavior? 
In considering this issue, it is worth observing that a similar dissociation between apparent implicit processing and explicit verbal performance is common elsewhere. There are a number of tasks in which both infants and adults process statistical information and use it to modify their behavior and judgment in normatively correct ways (e.g., Saffran et al., 1996). At the same time, even adults are notoriously bad at many problems involving probability and statistics when these require conscious deliberation and explicit verbal answers. The general pattern seems to be that often abilities involved in implicit processing are not easily deployed in explicit reasoning tasks –good normative performance on the latter requires specialized forms of explicit training, such as a course in statistics. A natural thought is that a similar point might hold for reasoning involving conditionals, including counterfactuals. 
Of course, the notion of implicit representation/processing in general (quite independently of whether it is claimed to involve counterfactuals) is far from transparent and it is unclear how to distinguish claims about implicit processing from claims that subjects merely behave ‘as if’ their behavior can be described in terms of such processing. This is an old problem in cognitive science and I won’t try to resolve it here. I will observe, however, that virtually all major theories of causal learning and judgment in psychology are not even prima-facie plausible if they are understood as claims about subject’s explicit mastery of concepts occurring in those theories. Instead, they must be understood as claims about implicit processing and representation or alternatively as a mere ‘as if’ theories. For example, the claims that subject’s causal judgments track p = p(O/A) – P (O/-A) or that they track causal power in Chang’s sense are not remotely plausible if understood as claims about subject’s explicit mastery of concepts like conditional probability. In this respect, the claim that subjects engage in implicit (or as if) counterfactual processing when they make causal judgments seems no different from similar claims made by other theories of casual judgment. ​[4]​ 
It is also worth noting that these considerations bear on the suggestion (cf. Beck et al., 2006) that, assuming that it is correct that counterfactual reasoning is difficult for small children, this is because of the demands it imposes on processes of working memory and executive function that are underdeveloped in small children. This suggestion seems more plausible for literal counterfactuals than for future hypotheticals. Difficulties in executive functioning also seem more likely for tasks involving explicit counterfactual reasoning (requiring correct verbal responses) than for tasks involving implicit counterfactual processing, assuming we can make sense of the latter idea. 

5. An Interventionist Account of Causal Representation 

My argument so far has been, in effect, that any attempt to connect causal cognition with counterfactual processing is going to have to regard much of that processing as ‘implicit’ (or ‘as if’ ) if it is going to be remotely plausible. That said, it seems undeniable that, even from an interventionist perspective, more is involved in human causal cognition than just being guided in one’s behavior by implicit beliefs or processing involving counterfactuals linking ones own actions to outcomes. As already observed, one consideration supporting this assessment is that the above description may be satisfied by learning involving just operant conditioning – that is, the implicit learning of action/outcome contingencies, and this seems to fall short of full fledged human causal representation. 
What more, then, is required for guidance by genuinely casual representations? Let me suggest two candidates for additional necessary conditions. 
1) To the extent that operant conditioning just involves an organism learning about relationships between its own behavior and outcomes these produce, the representations involved are egocentric. Human causal representation is allocentric rather than egocentric; it involves the idea that the very same relationship present between my actions and outcomes can be present both when other organisms act, and in nature, independently of the action of any organism. To employ an example from Woodward, 2007, human causal representation is such that it represents the same (type) causal relationship as present between (i) the shaking of a tree limb by the wind and the fall of fruit from the limb and (ii) when we or another organism shake the limb. This helps to enable forms of causal learning in humans that would not be possible in organisms whose representations were more egocentric—one can learn both from the interventions of others and from observing regularities in nature. 
2) Human causal representation seems allocentric map-like in other respects as well. Although type causation is not in general transitive, it is often true that if i) X causes Y and (ii) Y causes Z, we may reliably conclude that (iii) X causes Z. Human planning and means/ends reasoning to produce desired effects often involves (among other things) the capacity to put together beliefs of form (i) and (ii) together to get a belief and associated procedure in the form of (iii) which allows one to produce some desired goal: I want enemy dead and recognize that a large falling rock will kill him but I can’t directly move the necessary rock. I also recognize, however, that levers can move rocks etc. Notice that this causal connection between moving the lever and enemy’s death may not reflect any regularity that I have previously observed occurring spontaneously in nature. Instead, I likely have to (physically) construct the relevant connection after (in some sense) recognizing its possibility. This is analogous to the way in which possession of an allocentric spatial map can allow for the solution of novel navigational tasks that could not be solved with a more egocentric form of spatial representation. Like allocentric spatial maps, human causal representation takes a form which integrates or ties together different pieces of causal information rather than leaving them isolated from one another and thus allows causal insight into novel situations. 
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^1	  For example, it fails to account for the experimental results from Mandel discussed below. 
^2	  For such an interpretation of backwards blocking, see Mitchell, C., Lovibond, P. and Condoleon, M. (2005) and for additional discussion, McCormack et al. (forthcoming). 
^3	  For discussion of some of the relevant empirical results, see McCormack et al. (forthcoming). Unlike some other researchers, these authors find evidence that counterfactual and causal judgments are ‘psychologically related’; although the former lag the latter in development; in their words, their ‘findings are broadly consistent with any approach that assumes that counterfactual judgments are made on the basis of the same representations that underpin causal judgments’. 
^4	  This way of looking at things may help with another puzzle. On the one hand, it seems introspectively plausible that running what one might think of as counterfactual simulations of actual experiments in one’s head can sometimes help one to reason about causal relationships. On the other hand, in ‘running’ such counterfactuals and seeing what results, don’t we have to make use of causal knowledge that we already possess? If so, how could this process possibly help to clarify our understanding of causal relationships? One possible answer: the use of counterfactual simulation might help to clarify causal relationships if the causal/counterfactual knowledge one draws on to run the simulation is tacit or non-explicit and if the simulation allows one to access or make explicit implications of this knowledge. A similar idea might help to explain why (as a matter of empirical fact) connecting causal claims to explicit counterfactuals often seems to help clarify or elucidate them.  
